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Abstract
This article examines the role of the United States in the 
international refugee regime. It argues that the United States 
generally leads in assistance and protection of refugees 
and displaced persons when three conditions are present: 
a strong link to US foreign policy; clear and highly visible 
humanitarian needs and important domestic constituencies 
in support of action; and strong congressional support. The 
United States manifests its leadership through its financial 
contributions, as the largest donor to the array of interna-
tional organizations with responsibilities in this area; reset-
tlement of the refugees; and the use of the convening power 
of the US government. Nevertheless, there are reasons to be 
cautious about US leadership. While it is unlikely that the 
United States will soon lose its status as principal donor and 
principal strategist on tackling displacement, its ability to 
generate new resettlement offers is less clear, as is its ability 
to increase its own resettlement levels. The asylum system 
still has significant gaps, making it difficult for the United 
States to lead by example.
Résumé
Cet article examine le rôle que jouent les États-Unis (É.-U.) 
vis-à-vis du régime international des réfugiés. Il défend 
l’idée que les États-Unis jouent généralement un rôle de 
leader actif en matière d’assistance et de protection appor-
tées aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées quand trois 
conditions sont remplies : l’existence d’un lien solide avec la 
politique étrangère des É.-U., un solide soutien du Congrès, 
et la coexistence de besoins humanitaires manifestes et 
particulièrement visibles et d’importantes parties prenantes 
nationales pour soutenir leur action. En tant que principal 
donateur des organismes internationaux responsables dans 
ce domaine, les É.-U. expriment leur leadership par leurs 
contributions financières, mais aussi en réinstallant les réfu-
giés et en faisant appel au pouvoir de mobilisation de leur 
gouvernement. Il existe néanmoins des raisons d’être vigi-
lant vis-à-vis de leur leadership. Même s’il est peu probable 
qu’ils perdent dans un avenir proche leur statut de principal 
donateur et leur place parmi les principaux stratèges de la 
problématique des déplacements, leur capacité à offrir de 
nouveaux sites de réinstallation est moins évidente que celle 
de développer leurs propres sites. Le régime d’asile comporte 
encore d’importantes lacunes, qui rendent difficiles pour les 
É.-U. de diriger par l’exemple.
Introduction
This article examines the role of the United States in the international refugee regime. While the United States has been a strong supporter of multilateral institutions 
in issues that range from trade to health to security, this sup-
port has never been unconditional or absolute.1 There are 
many examples where the United States has used the United 
Nations to advance its foreign policy interests, but also many 
other instances where the United States has acted unilater-
ally and, rather than relying on multilateral structures, has 
turned to hand-picked “coalitions of the willing” to advance 
its foreign policy interests.2 So, too, US policy toward the 
international refugee regime has been ambivalent: on the 
one hand, US support for multilateral governance of global 
refugee issues has been crucial. On the other hand, the 
United States has sometimes taken unilateral actions in ways 
that have weakened this international order. 
The United States has ratified the principal instruments 
that protect refugees; offers substantial financial support to 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
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international humanitarian organizations; accepts tens of 
thousands of refugees each year for permanent resettlement; 
provides asylum and temporary protection to still further 
persons arriving spontaneously on its territory; has systems 
that offer protection to victims of trafficking; and has pledged 
to help reduce statelessness. While the United States is thus 
often identified as a key proponent of an effective interna-
tional system for assistance and protection of refugees and 
forced migrants, its policies on refugees and other forced 
migrants, particularly those seeking to arrive on its borders, 
have sometimes weakened the international refugee regime. 
Nor has its support for multilateral approaches to refugee 
assistance and protection been consistent; as discussed in 
the following sections, at times the United States has relied 
on unilateral policies, whereas at others it has cooperated 
with other governments and international organizations to 
improve responses to refugee crises.
This article considers the factors that explain when the 
United States chooses to act multilaterally through the insti-
tutions and decision-making procedures of the global refu-
gee regime. By considering the history of US engagement in 
global refugee issues, we argue that the United States chooses 
to be an active and influential member of the global refugee 
regime when several conditions come together. First, when 
there have been strong foreign policy linkages to crises that 
produce refugees, and the refugees themselves are seen as 
a manifestation of US policy interests, the United States has 
been more willing to take action and influence the decisions 
of others. Second, clear and highly visible humanitarian 
needs and important domestic constituencies in support of 
action to address those needs help mobilize US leadership. 
Third, strong congressional backing of presidential decisions 
to exert US leadership facilitates those actions, especially 
when new resources must be appropriated in support of pro-
active policies and programs.
This article begins with discussion of the historical role of 
the United States in protection of refugees. It then focuses 
specifically on US leadership during the Cold War as the cur-
rent refugee regime was established. The following section 
discusses the evolution in US attitudes towards the interna-
tional organizations mandated to assist and protect refugees 
and displaced persons. The current mechanisms by which 
the United States exercises leadership internationally are then 
examined, focusing on three policy frameworks: (1) financial 
support to the international refugee system; (2) admission 
of refugees and others in need of international protection; 
and (3) use of its convening power to mobilize support for 
solutions for refugees and concrete commitments by other 
states. The article concludes with an assessment of current 
US leadership and likely role in the future.
The Historical Role of the United States in Refugee 
Protection
The United States is the quintessential nation of immigrants, 
founded in large part by people seeking safety from persecu-
tion and religious intolerance, albeit often in turn displacing 
indigenous populations living in settlement areas. From the 
seventeenth century through the first decade of the twenti-
eth, the United States provided a safety net for millions of 
refugees, mostly from Europe, through its largely open door 
immigration policies. While providing no specific admis-
sions priority or distinctions for those whom we would now 
identify as refugees, US policies on religious toleration and 
the Constitutional Bill of Rights proved to be a strong draw 
for those fleeing persecution, especially on the basis of their 
religion, ethnicity, and political opinions. 
The first specific mention of flight from persecution as a 
basis for special treatment in US immigration law appeared 
in 1917 when legislation was passed requiring new immi-
grants to be literate in their native language. Persons fleeing 
religious persecution in their home countries, either by law 
or practice, were explicitly exempted from the requirement.3 
In vetoing the legislation, President Woodrow Wilson stated 
his opposition to the literacy requirement in general but 
also cited problems with the exemption. He had previously 
criticized the literacy test as an affront to the United States 
as an asylum for the persecuted, but he found the formula-
tion of the refugee exemption troubling. It would require the 
US government to pass judgment on the actions of another 
government, potentially causing “very serious questions of 
international justice and comity”4 
The United States shifted its immigration policies more 
significantly in the 1920s towards more restrictive stand-
ards.5 For the first time, the country adopted overall numeri-
cal ceilings on admission and established national origins 
quotas that made it all but impossible for immigrants from 
Eastern and Southern Europe to enter. The legislation also 
confirmed the bars on admission of immigrants from Asia 
that had been adopted in 1882. No exceptions were made for 
refugees. In fact, during the Great Depression, administra-
tive actions made it even more difficult for refugees to enter 
than other immigrants.6
US leadership internationally on refugees also flagged dur-
ing this period. While the United States was the driving force 
behind the Evian Conference in 1938 to address the situation 
of refugees from Nazi Germany, the United States failed to 
make concrete commitments to accept refugees. The confer-
ence had a dual mission: to encourage countries to resettle 
refugees and to persuade Germany to establish an orderly 
emigration process. Although there was much sympathy 
expressed for the refugees, few concrete proposals came out 
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of the conference. From the beginning it was clear that little 
would happen at the conference. In calling for the confer-
ence, US President Franklin Roosevelt made it clear that 
he was not asking any country, including the United States, 
to change its refugee policy. Subsequently, no government 
pledged to resettle significant numbers of refugees (except 
for the Dominican Republic’s rather vague offer). After the 
conference, in a speech to the Party Congress in Nuremberg 
in September 1938, Adolf Hitler pointed to the hypocrisy of 
the countries that condemned Germany’s policies but would 
not admit Jewish refugees: “Lamentations have not led these 
democratic countries to substitute helpful activity at last for 
their hypocritical questions; on the contrary, these countries 
with icy coldness assured us that obviously there was no 
place for the Jews in their territory.”7 This recognition that 
other countries would do little to save the Jews and other 
refugees paved the way for the Holocaust. 
US Refugee Policy during the Cold War
After the Second World War, with concerns growing about 
Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and the large number 
of refugees in still unstable Western Europe, the United 
States began to adopt a series of administrative and legisla-
tive actions for the admission of refugees and displaced 
persons outside of the numerical limits and national origins 
quotas that remained in US legislation. US policy on refugees 
throughout the Cold War was developed to support US for-
eign policy interests and enjoyed strong bipartisan support in 
Congress. President Harry Truman signed a directive on 22 
December 1945 that outlined new administrative procedures 
to facilitate the admission of war victims into the United 
States. In 1948, Congress took action to expand admissions 
of displaced persons. The 1948 Act allowed the admission of 
220,000 displaced persons. They were to be admitted within 
existing quotas, so as not to raise questions about underlying 
law, but provisions were made to borrow, or mortgage, up 
to 50 per cent of a country’s annual numbers to facilitate the 
additional admissions. In 1950, proponents of more liberal 
immigration provisions were able to amend the Displaced 
Persons Act to increase the number of available visas and 
lessen some of the more restrictive aspects. The numbers to 
be admitted increased to 415,000, but maintained the “mort-
gaging” provisions. It eliminated preferences for persons 
engaged in agriculture and for those from the Baltic countries. 
It allowed admission to those who had entered displaced 
persons camps after 1945. Further legislation followed. The 
Refugee Relief Act of 1953 offered 205,000 entry slots, this 
time without borrowing from the national origins quotas. 
The Refugee Relief Act went beyond the displaced persons 
legislation in covering “any person in a country or area which 
is neither Communist nor Communist dominated, who 
because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity 
or military operation is out of his usual place of abode and 
unable to return thereto, who has not been firmly resettled, 
and who is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of 
life or for transportation.” The legislation defined an escapee 
as any refugee who had fled a Communist country. The Ref-
ugee Relief Act expired just after the country was called to 
respond to the next refugee crisis—the flight of refugees after 
the abortive Hungarian Revolution in 1956. The president 
authorized use of 6,500 of the Refugee Relief Act visas for the 
Hungarians before its expiration. Others would be admitted 
under a provision in the McCarran-Walters Act that allowed 
the attorney general to allow foreign nationals to enter under 
his own authority. Called the parole authority,8 it was used to 
permit about 38,000 Hungarians to enter the United States 
between the end of 1956 and May 1957. Again, the United 
States demonstrated flexibility in applying existing legisla-
tion to support its foreign policy objectives. In September 
1957, new legislation was passed that permitted allocation of 
visa numbers that had been authorized but not used in the 
Refugee Relief Act. This legislation, the Refugee Escapee Act, 
defined refugee-escapees as persons fleeing Communist or 
Communist-dominated countries or countries in the Mid-
dle East because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on racial, religious, or political grounds.9 
Although using persecution criteria found in the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention, the US legislation restricted the refugee defi-
nition to those it found ideologically compatible—persons 
fleeing persecution by Communist regimes.
The parole authority also continued to be to address spe-
cific refugee emergencies. The Refugee Fair Share Act in 1960 
authorized its use for a limited number of refugees. When 
the Cuban revolution installed a Communist regime, how-
ever, the United States opened its doors to one of the larg-
est groups admitted under the parole authority. Unlike the 
European refugees, the Cubans initially came on their own, 
often on tourist visas. American policy was to parole them 
into the country, and then, under the Cuban Adjustment Act 
of 1966, to convert their status to permanent resident. Later 
in the 1960s, the United States and Cuba would negotiate an 
airlift that brought the Cubans directly to the United States. 
This pattern continued in the 1970s. The parole authority was 
used to admit large numbers of refugees from Southeast Asia 
and the former Soviet Union.10 Only when the Refugee Act 
of 1980 was enacted did the United States establish a perma-
nent system for admission of refugees to be resettled into the 
country, as discussed below.
US Engagement with International Organizations
In the years during and after the Second World War, the 
United States initially supported but showed great skepticism 
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about the multilateral organizations established to address 
what was often called the “refugee problem.” Although a 
strong supporter of the newly formed United Nations and 
a principal architect of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the US government was concerned about the high 
cost of the multilateral programs. In 1943, at the urging of the 
US government, the Un Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration (UNRRA) was established to give aid to areas liberated 
from the Axis powers. UNRRA acted in conjunction with the 
military authorities and local officials in providing relief to 
civilians, including those who had been displaced. Its scope 
of operation in Europe was Austria, Germany, Italy, and cer-
tain areas in Africa and the Near East. It was also responsible 
for relief in China and other areas occupied by Japan. Its 
budget was nearly $3.4 billion, with the United States con-
tributing $2.8 billion.11 Over time, however, the United States 
became increasingly dissatisfied with these costs, especially 
those that supported repatriation of displaced persons to 
Eastern European countries that were by then under the 
control of the Soviet Union.
Succeeding UNRRA was the International Refugee Organi-
zation (IRO) established by the General Assembly in Decem-
ber 1946. The IRO Constitution defined refugees as persons 
who belonged to one of several categories:
• Victims of the Nazi or fascist regimes or of regimes that 
took part on their side in the Second World War, or 
of the quisling or similar regimes that assisted them 
against the United Nations, whether enjoying interna-
tional status as refugees or not;
• Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist 
regime in Spain, whether enjoying international status 
as refugees or not;
• Persons who were considered “refugees” before the 
outbreak of the Second World War, for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinion.12
The IRO provided assistance to about 1.6 million displaced 
persons, including those still in camps and others who were 
spontaneously settled. The organization helped resettle 
about one million refugees to third countries. By contrast, 
only 54,000 refugees received assistance in repatriating to 
their home country.13 
Despite the success of the agency, about 400,000 refugees, 
many old and infirm, remained in displaced persons camps 
in 1950. The US Congress made clear that it did not intend 
to continue to fund the IRO and expected the European 
countries to assume the costs of the residual refugee popula-
tion. Marshall Plan funds could be used to shore up their 
capacities to accomplish this goal. Consequently, the IRO was 
disbanded, to be succeeded by the UNHCR. 
The US government was not an early supporter of UNHCR. 
It preferred to resettle refugees through its own resettlement 
programs, finding them less costly and more consistent with 
US priorities. Congress had also passed legislation preclud-
ing use of migration and refugee funds for organizations 
with Communist members. Though not focused specifically 
on UNHCR, whose members were mostly non-Communist 
governments, this Cold War provision undermined US par-
ticipation in a range of Un initiatives related to refugees and 
migrants.14 More specific to UNHCR were US concerns about 
its leadership. Un High Commissioner van Heuven Goed-
hart had been appointed over US objections, which may have 
contributed to its reluctance to support the organization he 
directed.15 But funding continued to be an issue. The United 
States blocked an attempt by the first high commissioner to 
establish a Un Refugee Emergency Fund, though the General 
Assembly authorized him in 1952 to raise $3 million for such 
a fund. Even that authorization was for new emergencies, not 
to support the refugees already under his mandate—many of 
whom were ineligible for resettlement and in dire need of 
relief. The United States again argued that the Marshall Plan 
provided sufficient resources for the care of refugees. Suffice 
it to say, in the absence of the largest donor of the United 
Nations and the largest resettlement country, UNHCR had a 
monumental task. Moreover, at this time, UNHCR was not 
an operational agency but rather was intended to focus on 
protection of refugees in Europe. 
In light of these developments, the United States and 
Belgium co-hosted a conference in Brussels to identify what 
additional efforts were needed to resolve the situation of 
refugees and others who wished to migrate. The Brussels 
conference brought together representatives of twenty-three 
countries, which Edward O’Connor, the head of the US Dis-
placed Persons Commission, divided into four categories: (1) 
countries of emigration (e.g., Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Austria, and Greece); (2) countries of immigration (e.g., 
Canada, Australia, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia); (3) interested 
countries (neither emigration nor immigration) that recog-
nized the seriousness of the problem (e.g., France, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Luxembourg); and (4) the United 
States, which had agreed to fund much of the initial budget 
of any new organization that might be formed.16 
The conference resulted in the establishment of a Provi-
sional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of 
Migrants from Europe in 1951, which was later named the 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and 
still later, the International Organization for Migration. As 
participants such as O’Connor readily admitted, the new 
organization was intended to buttress the interests of the 
West against those of the Communist world. Only countries 
that believed in freedom of movement for their citizens 
could become members, which meant that Communist 
governments that restricted departures could not join. This 
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provision not only complied with the congressional bar on 
funding of organizations that included Communist mem-
bers, it gave a sense of community to countries that had 
disparate histories and experiences with migration. As with 
UNHCR, the organization was supposed to finish its work in 
three years, but it too persisted into the present. In contrast 
to UNHCR’s lack of operational engagement, from the begin-
ning IOM was intended to serve its members and developed a 
strong operational capacity. Over the years, the United States 
turned to the IOM to provide operational support for refugee 
resettlement and to engage in many other tasks of interest to 
the US government. 
The United States also exercised clear leadership in estab-
lishing two other international organizations that assisted 
refugees: the UN Relief and Works Administration for Pales-
tinian Refugees (UNRWA) and the UN Korean Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNKRA).
UNRWA was established in 1949 to provide assistance and 
employment opportunities for Palestinian refugees. Until 
then, most aid was provided by the Red Cross and the Amer-
ican Friends Service Committee. UNRWA was asked specifi-
cally to take on two tasks. First, it was to carry out direct 
relief and works programs, and second, it was to consult with 
the host countries on measures to reduce the need for inter-
national assistance. These two tasks were consistent with the 
sense of the General Assembly, expressed in the 1949 Resolu-
tion creating UNRWA, that “continued assistance for the relief 
of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions 
of starvation and distress among them and to further condi-
tions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures 
should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the ter-
mination of international assistance for relief.”17 The United 
States was an early donor to UNRWA and continues as the 
principal bilateral supporter of its programs. 
UNKRA was established by the General Assembly on 1 
December 1950 as a “special authority with broad powers 
to plan and supervise rehabilitation and relief ” in South 
Korea.18 According to a contemporary analysis, the United 
States was the leading proponent of the new organization 
and based its support on three principal assumptions:
First, the establishment of the agency was predicated on military 
success and an early cessation of hostilities … Second, military suc-
cess offered the prospect of creating a unified Korea under interna-
tional auspices, an aim toward which United States policy had been 
directed since the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese control 
in 1945. And third, a unified Korea, striving for independence under 
the heavy burdens of military destruction, would require large 
sums of money in economic aid which the United States would be 
obliged to supply or risk losing Korea after winning the war.19
A multilateral agency, organized in the context of the 
United Nations, would help ensure that the costs of this 
endeavour would be shared with other countries.
The first two assumptions proved more elusive than antic-
ipated, and the third was harder to achieve in the absence of 
an end to hostilities. As occurred during the Second World 
War, the military forces led by the United States retained 
broad authority over the relief operations occurring within 
their theatre of activities. Even after the truce ending the 
hostilities was signed, raising funds for UNKRA was difficult 
because other countries saw South Korea as being within the 
US sphere of interest. As such, the expectation was that the 
United States would fund the recovery. Nevertheless, in 1952 
UNKRA began operations with a budget of $71 million. 
When the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolu-
tion took place in 1956, the United States began to shift its 
views on UNHCR. The General Assembly asked UNHCR to 
use its good offices to assist and protect the refugees, even 
though they were not covered under the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention (as the events causing their displacement occurred 
after 1951). Then, in 1957, UNHCR was called upon to respond 
to the refugee crises generated by the Algerian conflict and 
the continuing flow of people from mainland China into 
Hong Kong. These were both sensitive situations, as the 
interests of the permanent members of the Security Council 
were implicated—France in Algeria, and China (at that time 
the government in Taiwan held the seat) and Britain in Hong 
Kong. The organization was effective in its actions in each 
of these situations, and the United States, along with other 
major donors, allowed the growth of the organization’s man-
date and budget. US support for UNHCR was directly related 
to the fact that it was useful to its foreign policy interests.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the United States was more 
than willing to fund UNHCR’s operations when it served US 
foreign policy goals. Refugee camps in Pakistan, Thailand, 
Honduras, and elsewhere became safe zones for the families 
of military forces fighting against the regimes in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, and Nicaragua, respectively. At the same time, 
bipartisan political coalitions and important domestic con-
stituencies in the United States generally supported expendi-
ture of resources on refugees. For example, many veterans of 
the Vietnam conflict as well as religious and humanitarian 
organizations threw their support behind resettlement of 
refugees from Indochina. Culminating this period was US 
leadership in 1979 to develop a comprehensive approach to 
address the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. Unlike the dis-
astrous conference in Evian, the Geneva conference called by 
the United States was a resounding success. Vice-President 
Walter Mondale chaired the conference, demonstrating how 
seriously the United States government took the issue. The 
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US delegation came with a pledge to resettle at least 14,000 
Indochinese refugees per month for whatever time it took to 
stabilize the situation. Its call for others to resettle refugees 
was met with widespread agreement. The conference also 
resulted in pledges from the countries of first asylum to keep 
their borders open and from Vietnam to establish an orderly 
departure program for those wanting to leave the country. US 
financial resources would back up the agreement. 
Significantly, until the late 1960s, the United States did not 
ratify the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, prefer-
ring to operate under its own domestic refugee legislation 
rather than international standards. In 1968, however, the 
United States became party to the Convention by ratifying 
the 1967 Protocol. No new legislation was adopted, however, 
to implement US commitments under the Refugee Con-
vention until 1980. In fact, in asking for ratification of the 
Protocol, the Executive Branch assured Congress that US law 
already included a non-refoulement (non-forcible return) 
provision, in the form of withholding of removal (referred 
to as withholding of deportation, until 1996). Withholding is 
mandatory for those who can demonstrate it is more likely 
than not that they will be persecuted if returned to their 
countries of origin unless they have committed an aggra-
vated felony resulting in a prison sentence of five years or 
more. The Refugee Act of 1980 adopted the 1951 Convention 
definition of a refugee for the purposes of asylum and refugee 
resettlement, removing the language related to Communism. 
Through the remainder of the decade, however, the United 
States continued to give priority to admission of refugees 
from Communist countries.
US Leadership Today
The United States leads on refugee issues in two principal 
ways: as a donor and as a recipient of refugees. In the for-
mer case, the US focus is generally on assistance and protec-
tion for the millions of refugees and displaced persons who 
live in developing countries. In the latter case, the focus is 
on policies regarding admission and stay of those seeking 
protection within the United States. These policies are often 
seen as positive models for other countries, although there 
are cases—such as US policy of interdicting Haitians—that 
have served as models for deterrence policies taken by gov-
ernments in other parts of the world. 
United States and the International Refugee System
The United States remains the largest single contributor to 
international protection and assistance programs for refu-
gees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), through sup-
port for UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM, the UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Assistance, the World Food Program, 
and the principal non-governmental organizations assisting 
displaced populations. The United States is the largest donor 
to the UNHCR in absolute terms (almost US$1.5 billion in 2016) 
and ranked eleventh on both a per capita and GDP basis. The 
United States provides general support as well as earmarked 
funds for specific programs. The United States also provides 
about US$103 million to IOM for its operational programs. 
The majority of these funds are earmarked for programs 
for displaced persons and refugee resettlement. Initiatives 
such as the evacuation of migrants from Libya have received 
special attention, with the United States contributing US$27.1 
million. The United States contributed US$360 million to 
UNRWA as well.20 These numbers do not include the addi-
tional hundreds of millions spent on bilateral humanitarian 
assistance to governments and non-governmental organiza-
tions, much of which is spent on displaced persons.
Funding for refugees and displaced persons comes from 
two principal US agencies: the Bureau for Population, Refu-
gees and Migration (BPRM) in the US State Department, and 
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the US 
Agency for International Development. In general, BPRM is 
responsible for refugees and provides the majority of its sup-
port through multilateral organizations such as UNHCR, IOM, 
and UNRWA. OFDA is responsible for internally displaced 
persons and spends a higher proportion of its funding on 
bilateral assistance. As UNHCR and IOM have increased their 
support for internally displaced persons from both conflict 
and natural disasters, the lines between the two agencies’ 
spheres of influence have blurred.
Beyond its funding, the United States also leads through 
its membership in the Executive Committee (ExCom) of 
the UNHCR and the governing councils of UNRWA and IOM, 
in addition to its important role as a permanent member of 
the Security Council. The ExCom was established by the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and formally came 
into existence on 1 January 1959. ExCom is composed of UN 
member states who are elected by ECOSOC. ExCom’s reports 
are submitted directly to the General Assembly; they do not 
substitute for policy guidance from ECOSOC and the General 
Assembly but play an important function in advising the 
high commissioner, reviewing funds and programs, author-
izing the high commissioner to make appeals for funds, and 
approving proposed budget targets. The membership has 
grown from 25 to almost 100 members since its founding. 
The United States plays an outsized role in ExCom. While 
it cannot always persuade other governments to follow its 
lead, it can effectively veto any conclusion that it opposes. As 
the largest donor, the United States has tremendous influ-
ence on UNHCR’s finances and thus holds sway on issues that 
directly or indirectly involve funding. More often, though, 
the United States attempts to influence UNHCR practice 
through a positive use of its resources and ideas. The United 
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States often uses ExCom to announce new initiatives to 
reform the way in which UNHCR operates. For example, at 
the 2013 ExCom, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns 
announced funding for Safe from the Start, a new initiative 
in keeping with longstanding US support for gender-friendly 
refugee policies: “Safe from the Start … asks UNHCR, ICRC, 
and other aid agencies to add protection of women and girls 
to the short-list of priority actions at the onset of emergen-
cies. Our new funding will enable our partners to hire spe-
cialized staff, conduct more training, and deploy new and 
innovative programs at the earliest stages of our response. 
Some of these measures will take time, but Safe from the 
Start can make a real difference in the near-term. We know 
we have many allies, but we look to others to join us in this 
important effort.”21
The United States also uses presidential statements at the 
General Assembly to draw attention to refugee issues. At the 
2013 UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Develop-
ment, the United States pledged to co-chair the Migrants 
in Countries in Crisis initiative that would develop non-
binding guidance for countries of origin, transit, and desti-
nation on how best to address the situation of non-nationals 
affected by conflict and natural disasters. The United States 
was joined by the Philippines as co-chair, and Australia, 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and the European Com-
mission as members. The UN High Level Meeting on Large 
Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrants took note of the 
initiative and committed to “assist, impartially and on the 
basis of needs, migrants in countries that are experiencing 
conflicts or natural disasters, working, as applicable, in coor-
dination with the relevant national authorities.”22 Just as the 
United States has used “coalitions of the willing” to support 
foreign policy interests, it has turned to “mini-multilateral-
ism,”23 in pursuing specific humanitarian interests that fall 
outside existing international legal frameworks.
Most recently, President Barak Obama convened a US 
Leaders’ summit on 20 September 2016, during the 2016 
General Assembly meetings, to mobilize new commit-
ments to the global refugee crisis. The announcement of this 
summit came immediately after the UN General Assembly 
decided to convene a high-level plenary on Large Move-
ments of Refugees and Migrants on 19 September 2016. 
While the UN meeting sought to improve multilateral 
responses to both refugees and migrants, the US initiative 
focused on three specific objectives with respect to refugees: 
(1) to increase humanitarian funding from $10 billion in 2015 
to $13 billion in 2016 by identifying new donors and increas-
ing donations among existing ones; (2) to double the number 
of refugees to be resettled by identifying new resettlement 
countries, expanding the resettlement commitments of 
resettlement countries, and providing other legal channels 
for humanitarian admission when resettlement provides 
insufficient access; and (3) to facilitate refugee inclusion and 
self-reliance to “enable refugees to meet their own needs 
and contribute to communities that host them.”24 In this 
regard, the United States sought and received commitments 
for more educational and work opportunities for refugees 
worldwide.
Leading (or Not) by Example
The United States leads through its own policies for admis-
sion of refugees and displaced persons. In some cases, it has 
been a model for positive policies that promote protection 
and solutions whereas in others, it has been a model for poli-
cies that impede protection. 
Refugees and others needing international protection 
come to the United States in multiple ways. As discussed 
above, it has long resettled refugees, granting them perma-
nent admissions25 and a pathway towards citizenship. Of the 
73,000 refugees who UNHCR reports were admitted to thirty 
resettlement countries in 2014, the United States resettled 
49,000 (67 per cent). The total number of refugees resettled 
in the United States (not all are referred by UNHCR) has num-
bered about 70,000 per year in the recent past. 
BPRM and US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security share 
admissions responsibility, and BPRM and the Office of Refu-
gee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human 
Services share responsibility for assistance to refugees. The 
US resettlement program is open only to those who meet the 
definition of a refugee in the Refugee Act of 1980, which is 
similar to the UN Refugee Convention definition. The United 
States does not have a provision for admitting victims of civil 
war or armed conflict or of massive violations of human 
rights that do not fall under the Convention refugee defini-
tion. However, legislation does permit the designation as ref-
ugees of persons still inside their countries of origin if they 
otherwise meet the eligibility requirements,26 which allows 
processing of refugees in countries of origin, as occurred in 
the former Soviet Union, Vietnam, Haiti, and Cuba. US law 
also recognizes that persons who have suffered particularly 
serious forms of persecution are eligible for admission, even 
if they are no longer at risk of future persecution.
Refugees must demonstrate they have not established 
residence in a country of first asylum, and they are subject 
to security and criminal checks. US legislation specifies 
that refugees who provided material support to a terrorist 
organization are ineligible for admission. Terrorist organiza-
tions are broadly defined to include most insurgent groups, 
whether or not they use terrorist means towards their goals, 
and there is no exception for coercion, so refugees who have 
been forced to provide material support or paid ransoms to 
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free themselves or their relatives are inadmissible for entry 
into the United States, unless a waiver is granted. Thousands 
of persons recognized as refugees are awaiting resettlement 
in countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Ecuador, and 
Thailand, often in very difficult circumstances, because secu-
rity checks have not been completed.27 Often the problem 
is a lack of information to confirm that someone is not a 
security risk, rather than credible documentation that he or 
she is a risk.28
Each year, the president in consultation with Congress 
determines how many refugees will be admitted each year 
and how that number will be allocated by region. Priorities 
for resettlement within regional allocations are: (1) cases 
involving persons facing compelling security concerns; 
(2) cases involving persons from specific groups of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States; and (3) family 
reunification cases involving close relatives of persons admit-
ted as refugees or granted asylum.29 In September 2015 the 
government announced its intention to increase the ceiling 
on admissions for Fiscal Year (FY) 201630 to 85,000 and to 
100,000 in FY 2017, and in advance of the US Leaders’ Summit 
it announced an additional increase to 110,000 for FY 2017. 
Ten thousand of the additional numbers in FY 2016 would 
go to resettlement of Syrian refugees. Although still lower 
than historical highs, this expansion represents a significant 
increase over resettlement in the years immediately after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks when admissions reached a 
low of 27,000 refugees. 
After the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the 
decision to increase resettlement of Syrian refugees was 
met with intense opposition from some state governors 
and Republican candidates for president. Arguing that 
terrorists could be resettled along with bona fide refugees, 
those opposed to bringing Syrian refugees to the country 
argued that their first concern was the safety of their own 
populations. They questioned whether the process used in 
approving refugees for resettlement was sufficiently rigorous 
to screen out those posing security threats. Governor Chris 
Christie of New Jersey (also a presidential candidate) went 
as far as saying that he would not even take a three-year-
old orphan—a particularly callous remark in the context of 
Aylan Kurdi, the drowned three-year-old Syrian boy whose 
photo captured so effectively the desperation of many Syrian 
refugees. Since then, several states have filed lawsuits against 
the federal government for continuing to resettle Syrian 
refugees, and one state has proposed legislation to hold vol-
untary agencies that bring refugees from “high-risk,” mostly 
Muslim countries accountable if the refugees commit crimes 
within five years of admission. 
The controversy over resettlement is reminiscent of the 
debates in the 1930s and could have serious repercussions for 
US leadership on refugee issues. Without support from Con-
gress and state governors, it would be very difficult for the 
United States to raise its levels of resettlement much beyond 
current levels. Had the governors succeeded with their law-
suits, this would have hampered the ability of the president 
to call upon other countries to significantly increase their 
resettlement efforts at the summit he hosted in September 
2016. 
In addition to its resettlement program, the United States 
operates an asylum program for those who spontaneously 
arrive in the country and claim refugee status. How the 
United States handles asylum applications arguably affects 
its influence on refugee protection worldwide. Attempts by 
the United States to deter would-be asylum seekers have 
been duplicated by other countries, as have been efforts to 
broaden the scope of protection through its initiatives to 
extend protection on the basis of gender-based persecution. 
Between 25,000 and 30,000 asylees are granted asylum 
each year.31 At present, there are significant backlogs of asy-
lum cases awaiting adjudication. The large-scale movement 
of Central Americans, particularly unaccompanied minors 
and families with young children, has stretched the capacity 
of the asylum system in recent years. As the countries of the 
Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) 
saw significant increases in homicides and other forms of 
gang violence, many more Central Americans took the risk 
of transiting Mexico to come to the United States.32 During 
the summer of 2014, the president called the arrival of about 
70,000 unaccompanied minors a “humanitarian emergency” 
that was straining resources for their care as well as adjudica-
tion of claims for relief from deportation. The administration 
was criticized for its policies regarding families with children 
who were detained for what appeared to be excessive peri-
ods. An announcement that the United States would step up 
resources to deport families who had exhausted their legal 
appeals drew still further criticism. Opponents argued that 
many of the families did not have adequate or any legal rep-
resentation, which can harm the adjudication of their claims. 
Like other countries, the United States has used policies 
to avert the arrival of asylum claimants. Some policies are 
in the category of “sticks” designed to deter asylum seekers 
from seeking entry, including mandatory detention and 
interdiction. For example, US policies to interdict, detain, 
and deport Haitians seeking entry to the United States 
have not only been inconsistent with policies toward other 
arrivals, particularly Cubans, but have served as a negative 
example for other countries. Others are arguably “carrots.” 
For example, in partial response to the Central American 
surge in applications, and recognition of the dangers to 
transiting asylum seekers, the United States put established 
an in-country processing system through which the children 
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of parents already living in the United States could apply for 
refugee resettlement or other admissions programs from 
home. Both modes of operation have been replicated by 
other countries experiencing their own increase in asylum 
seekers.
On the positive side, the United States can be credited 
leading on other aspects of asylum adjudications. For exam-
ple, it led in establishing that fear of persecution by non-state 
actors can be a basis for asylum if the government of the 
country of origin is unwilling or unable to protect the appli-
cant. The United States was also among the first countries to 
provide guidance to asylum adjudicators regarding gender-
based persecution, issuing guidelines in 1995.33 These guide-
lines focused on two aspects of gender and asylum: (1) that 
persecution can be gendered, as in the case of rape and sex-
ual abuse; and (2) persecution can be on account of gender, 
particularly in cases involving sexual orientation, domestic 
violence, and female genital mutilation.34
Another model has been US legislation that authorizes 
persons whose countries of origin are experiencing conflict 
or natural disasters to remain in the country, even if they had 
originally entered illegally. Temporary protected status (TPS) 
applies to persons “in the United States who are temporar-
ily unable to safely return to their home country because of 
ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other 
extraordinary and temporary conditions.”35 Environmental 
disaster may include “an earthquake, flood, drought, epi-
demic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting 
in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living condi-
tions in the area affected.”36 In the case of environmental 
disasters, as compared to conflict, the country of origin must 
request designation of TPS for its nationals. 
The designation is still in effect for citizens of Honduras 
and Nicaragua (since 1998), El Salvador (2001), Somalia 
(2001), Sudan (2004), and Haiti (2010).37 In 2014–15 alone, 
new designations were made for citizens of Nepal (earth-
quake), Syria (conflict), Yemen (conflict), South Sudan (con-
flict) and Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Ebola).
Assessing US Leadership 
In general, the United States leads in assistance and protection 
of refugees and displaced persons. As discussed, it remains 
the largest donor to the array of international organizations 
with responsibilities in this area. Generally, there has been 
bipartisan support for these contributions to humanitarian 
programs. Although in recent years, all funding has seen sig-
nificant cuts, as pressure to reduce government spending has 
increased, the US budget for refugees has remained largely 
intact. There has been no effort to remove funding for the 
refugee resettlement program, despite the controversy over 
Syrian refugee admissions. These levels of funding, not only 
for UNHCR but also IOM, UNRWA, ICRC, and other humanitar-
ian agencies, effectively gives the United States veto power 
when setting the priorities of these organizations. 
US funding provides both multilateral and bilateral assis-
tance, giving some discretion to the international organiza-
tions to determine how to best meet the needs of refugees 
and displaced persons. At the same time, it has earmarked 
funds to encourage these agencies to address what the 
United States perceives as unmet needs. The Safe from the 
Start initiative is a case in point, as has been long-time US 
advocacy for the protection of refugee women and girls. 
The United States has pushed initiatives to expand protec-
tion for other populations, most recently migrants in coun-
tries in crisis. Only a handful of member states have taken on 
initiatives of this sort—the leadership of Norway and Swit-
zerland on the Nansen Initiative Global Protection Agenda 
for those who cross borders in the context of natural disas-
ters and the effects of climate change comes to mind. In the 
case of Nansen (as well as the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement and others), the US government took a keen 
interest but chose not to lead. By contrast, in each of these 
situations, US non-governmental organizations and experts 
played important roles in providing intellectual guidance to 
the initiatives.
The convening power of the US government has played an 
enormous role historically and continues to be a principal 
reflection of its leadership within the field. This power does 
not appear to have diminished, as witnessed by the response 
to President Obama’s decision to host a summit on refugees 
at the 2016 General Assembly. Over fifty governments, many 
represented by heads of state or government attended the 
Leaders’ Summit—a significant achievement, when consid-
ering that governments could attend only if they had made 
significant new commitments. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be cautious about US 
leadership. While it is unlikely that the United States will 
soon lose its status as principal donor and one of the princi-
pal strategists on tackling displacement issues, its ability to 
generate new resettlement offers is less clear, as is its ability to 
increase its own resettlement levels. Whenever resettlement 
in the United States has been a political football, rather than 
a testament to humanitarian, foreign policy, and domestic 
constituency interests, it has suffered. Continuing politi-
cal leadership from the supporters of a robust resettlement 
effort will be essential if the program is to grow, as the need 
for resettlement grows and respond efficiently and effectively 
to new demands.
The numbers who are resettled today are significantly 
lower than those of the early 1980s and well below the 
need for global resettlement. The multiple security checks 
imposed on applicants for resettlement leave applicants 
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neither approved nor denied but instead awaiting clearance. 
The asylum system still has significant gaps, particularly in 
provisions such as interdiction, detention, arbitrary dead-
lines, and security checks that make them inaccessible for 
too many asylum seekers with credible claims for protection. 
What does all of this mean for US leadership in the refu-
gee regime? By most measures, the United States is still the 
dominant power, whether measured by influence, money, or 
admission levels. Unlike in many other policy spheres, the 
United States has often preferred to operate through multi-
lateral approaches in encouraging protection and assistance 
for refugees and displaced persons. The US government has 
supported other governments that wish to lead in important 
international initiatives to enhance protection. Having other 
prominent states lead in the refugee regime is fully consist-
ent with US strategy. That having been said, however, there 
is little likelihood that major changes in policies or shifts in 
refugee priorities would succeed without US agreement to 
these practices.
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